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Abstract—This paper studies the effects on user welfare of
imposing network neutrality, using a game-theoretic model of
provider interactions based on a two-sided market framework:
we assume that the platform–the last-mile access providers
(ISPs)–are monopolists, and consider content providers (CPs)
entry decisions. All decisions affect the choices made by users,
who are sensitive both to CP and ISP investments (in content
creation and quality-of-service, respectively). In a non-neutral
regime, CPs and ISPs can charge each other, while such charges
are prohibited in the neutral regime. We assume those charges
(if any) are chosen by CPs, a direction rarely considered in the
literature, where they are assumed fixed by ISPs.
Our analysis suggests that, unexpectedly, more CPs enter the
market in a non-neutral regime where they pay ISPs, than
without such payments. Additionally, in this case ISPs tend to
invest more than in the neutral regime. From our results, the
best regime in terms of user welfare is parameter dependent,
calling for caution in designing neutrality regulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The network neutrality debate has been active for more
than a decade, and is still vivid, as illustrated by the re-
cent political decisions and interventions in Europe and the
United States (e.g., B. Obama’s intervention in Nov. 2014,
FCC’s February 2015 decision to regulate broadband services
under Title 2, European Parliament’s April 2014 report on
neutrality). The debate emerged from disputes between ISPs–
carrying traffic but making fixed revenues from users–and
CPs–making increasing revenue and attracting users with
bandwidth-consuming services: ISPs’ main claim was about
charging CPs for bandwidth a so-called side payment to cover
their soaring costs in network upgrades and maintenance. Such
practices have been labeled as non-neutral, since opening the
way to differentiated treatment of traffic based on economic
considerations. Much academic research has been carried out
on the subject, investigating the consequences of regulating
monetary exchanges between CPs and ISPs, on innovation
(no entry barriers for CPs), user Quality of Experience, or
user welfare (see [7]–[9], [17] and references therein). When
side-payments are considered, they are assumed fixed by ISPs.
On the contrary, in this paper we investigate the consequences
of letting the side-payment decision to CPs, even allowing
CPs to choose negative prices (i.e., to get paid by ISPs). Our
analysis shows that when actors are rational, this can lead to
satisfying situations: CPs indeed need ISPs to attract users,
and hence will care about ISP survivability when selecting
the side-payment values.
We develop a game-theoretic model in which the net-
work regime (neutral or non-neutral) affects strategic provider
choices, such as: investments of last-mile access providers
(ISPs) and content providers (CPs); ISP pricing of their end-
users; and CPs entry decisions and choices of side payments
to the ISP(s). We model CP-ISP interactions using a two-sided
market framework [1], [12], [13].
A number of researchers applied the ideas of two-sided mar-
kets to study network neutrality. Hermalin and Katz [5] model
neutrality as a restriction on the product space, and consider
whether ISPs should be allowed to offer differentiated services.
Hogendorn [6] studies two-sided markets where intermediaries
sit between “conduits” and CPs. In his context, neutrality
means that content has open access to the intermediaries.
Njoroge et al. [11] consider a two-sided market model with
heterogeneous CPs and end-users, and the ISPs play the role
of a platform. Weiser [16], and Lee and Wu [7] discuss
policy issues related to two-sided markets. Schwartz et al. [14]
study the effects of network neutrality on ISP and CP entry.
Since network regime profitability affects provider profits, the
market structure is affected as well. Remark that, for realistic
parameters, in most two-sided market models, aggregate user
welfare is higher in a non-neutral regime, see for example
[3], [10], [11], [14]. While our model closely relates to these
papers, here CPs choose their payment to ISPs. As a result,
the analysis of the game is considerably different: instead of
3 stages in [14], our game has five stages since three strategic
decisions previously made by ISPs (hence, simultaneously) are
now split between ISPs and CPs (hence sequentially).
We model a non-neutral network as allowing side payments
between CPs and ISPs, and a neutral one as forbidding such
side payments. Our end-user demand for content variety has a
flavor of the classical monopolistic competition model [2]. CPs
derive their revenue from advertisers, and ISPs from charging
end-users for traffic; in addition, in the non-neutral regime,
side payments affect provider revenues. We consider a usage-
based (actually, pay-per-click) pricing scheme for users, as
well as a price per click for CPs who (in the non-neutral
regime) pay the ISP for delivering content to users. While [10]
assumes both of those prices are chosen by the ISP to
maximize its profit, here we propose that the CPs “volunteer”
to pay to ISPs by deciding the value of the side-payment. This
gives rise to a multi-level game that we analyze by backward
induction to find an equilibrium. Numerical results indicate
that it can be in the best interest of CPs to voluntarily choose
to pay the ISPs, and that this can result in a higher aggregate
end user welfare than the no-side-payment situation.
Ceteris paribus, a neutral regime tends to be better for
aggregate user welfare when advertising rates are low, price
sensitivity of end-user demand is high, and added content
variety (modeled as a higher number of CPs) has little effect
on user demand, and CP entry costs are low. In reverse, a
non-neutral regime performs better when user demand has low
sensitivity to price and high sensitivity to content variety, and
CP entry costs are high.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces the setting and the mathematical model we
consider, and we present and compare the analytical resolution
for both neutrality scenarios in Section III. We then introduce
and discuss the CP entry game in Section IV, and provide a
numerical analysis in Section V. Conclusions and directions
for future work are given in Section VI.
II. MODEL
Let us assume that N (the number of ISPs) and M (the
number of CPs) are fixed. (Later on, we will consider an entry
game for CPs.) Throughout the paper we refer to a particular
ISP through the letter n, and a particular CP through the letter
m.
A. Payment structure
Payments are illustrated in Figure 1: each ISP acts as a
monopolist over some population of users (subscribers), which
are charged per usage. On the other side of the market, CPs
also pay the ISP (in the non-neutral regime) to access users.
More precisely, if an ISP n user clicks to obtain some content
from a CP m, that user pays pn(m) to her ISP and the CP
pays qm(n) to that ISP. CPs make money through advertising:
we assume each click earns the CP a fixed amount a.
CP 1 CP 2 . . . CP m . . . CP M
ISP 1 ISP NISP n. . . . . .
Users Users Users. . . . . .
Advertisers
a
qm(n)
pn(m)
Figure 1. Payments for each click of an ISP n user to get CP m content
(qm(n) = 0 in the neutral regime). The strategic players are ISPs–setting
prices (pn(m)) and investment levels (tn)–and CPs–setting prices (qm(n))
and investment levels (cm).
B. ISP profits
The number of clicks Bn,m of ISP n users for CP m content
is assumed to be as in [10]:
Bn,m = γc
v
mt
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ; (1)
with γ = 1−e
−kM
M1−vN1−w reflecting the user preferences for
content diversity1 in the game with given M and N , and the
other variables explained in Table I.
k user preference for content variety
cm CP m investment (content attracts users)
v demand sensitivity to CP investments
tn ISP n investment (attracts user demand)
w demand sensitivity to ISP investments
pn(m) price (per click for the m-th CP content) payed to the n-th
ISP by its users
qm(n) price (per click of the m-th CP content for n-th ISP users)
payed by the m-th CP to the n-th ISP
θ user insensitivity to price
α > 1 outside option for ISPs
β > 1 outside option for CPs
ce CP entry cost
Table I
PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Although quite complex, the expression (1) intends to cover
the main factors affecting demand: the number of clicks
from ISP n users on CP m content depends on content
diversity (M ), quality of service (through ISP n investments),
content quality (through CP m investments), and the click-
price p(n). The exponential form for the price-related part can
be interpreted as stemming from an exponential distribution
of the willingness-to-pay among users; for the investment-
related parts we use a Cobb-Douglas utility formulation,
which is classically used to model the preferences among
complementary resources (here, in content and network quality
which are complementary to attract demand) [15]. Note that
we assume v + w < 1, i.e., decreasing returns to scale.
The total number of clicks for ISP n is
Bn = γ(c
v
1 + ...+ c
v
M )t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ,
we can therefore express the profit of ISP n as
ΠTn =
M∑
m=1
(pn(m) + qm(n))Bn,m − αtn
=
M∑
m=1
(pn(m) + qm(n))γc
v
mt
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ − αtn, (2)
where qn(m) is a price paid by CP m for each click by a
customer of ISP n (the so-called side-payment, that may be
imposed by a regulator) and α > 1 is the outside option (gain
from alternative uses of funds).
1The denominator in γ acts as a normalization factor.
C. CP profits
CPs make profit through advertising (hence the incentive
to attract clicks) and undergo the side payment to ISPs. The
profit of each CP m, 1 ≤ m ≤M therefore equals
ΠCm =
N∑
n=1
Bn,m(a− qm(n))− β(cm + ce)
= cvmγ
N∑
n=1
(a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn/θ − β(cm + ce),(3)
with a the average revenue per click from advertisements, β >
1 the outside option and ce the CP entry cost.
D. Order of decisions
In this paper we consider two regimes, that lead to different
values of investments and prices.
1) Neutral regime: Here, the side payments
(qm(n))1≤m≤M,1≤n≤N are imposed to be 0. Decisions
are made in the following order:
a) at the largest time scale, the ISPs decide how much to
invest (variable tn for each n) and how much to price
each click (variables (pn(m))1≤m≤M for each ISP n),
through a non-cooperative game among ISPs.
b) at a smaller time scale, the CPs decide how much to
invest (variable cm for each m).
That regime has been studied in [10].
2) Non-neutral regime: In that regime, the side payments
also have to be decided. In this paper we assume they are
chosen by CPs, and that this decision takes place after ISP
investment decisions but before ISP pricing decisions. Indeed,
we expect that ISP investments (infrastructure costs) are for
large time scales, due to the enormous economic stakes, and
the fact that such investments correspond to time-consuming
actions (adding underground and/or underwater cables, pos-
sibly renegotiating agreements with backbone providers...).
On the other hand, the prices applied to users can change
quite rapidly. We consider that side-payments are set through
contracts (bargaining) between ISPs and CPs, which take place
at an intermediate time scale between those two. We keep
the CP investments for the smaller time scale, since content
creation can be very responsive to the conditions (i.e., to the
prices and side-payment levels as well as ISP investments).
Summarizing, the game is played as follows (from the largest
time scale to the smallest):
a) ISPs decide their investments (tm)1≤m≤M
b) Each CP m chooses what (possibly negative) price qm(n)
to pay to each ISP n
c) ISPs set their prices (pn(m))1≤n≤N,1≤m≤M
d) CPs set their investments (cm)1≤m≤M
Note that the order of decisions is the same for both the
neutral and non-neutral regimes: in the neutral regime the
side-payment choice is absent hence ISPs can simultaneously
decide their investments and prices. Of course this order of
decisions can be discussed, and variants are worth considering.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GAMES
We analyze the (Stackelberg) interactions among actors by
backward induction [4], meaning that decisions at each stage
are made anticipating the consequences on the smaller-time-
scale stages.
The outcome for the neutral case can be found in [10]. We
recall that result here.
Proposition 1: The neutral game has a unique equilibrium,
where
• all ISPs charge their users the same price per click
pneut = θpi where pi := 1
1 + vN(1−v)
;
• investments from ISPs all equal
tneut =
[
(x)
1−v
(
av
β
)v
e−p
neut/θ
] 1
1−v−w
(4)
where x := (1− e−kM )
1
1−v ·
(
θw
α
)
N
v+w−1
1−v ;
• all CPs invest at the same level
cneut =
[
(x)w
(
av
β
)1−w
e−p
neut/θ
] 1
1−v−w
·
(
1− e−kM
M1−v
Nw
) 1
1−v
.
Proof: See [10].
For the non-neutral case, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2: The non-neutral game has a unique symmet-
ric equilibrium, where
• investments from ISPs all equal
t˜ =
([
(1−R)
M
K˜
w
1− v
]1−v
θeq/θ−pipi(1− pi)v
) 1
1−v−w
(5)
where


pi = 11+ v
N(1−v)
R = N−1N
1
pi+
v
1−pi−1
1
pi+
1
1−pi−1
K˜ = αγ
(
v
1−v
vγ
β
)− v1−v
.
• payments from CPs to ISPs are all equal, to
qm(n) := q = a− θ; (6)
• user prices set by ISPs equal
pn(m) = p˜ = θpi − q = θ(1 + pi)− a.
• CP invest to a level
c =
(
vγ
β
Nθt˜wea/θ−(1+pi)
) 1
1−v
, (7)
where we do not replace t˜ by its expression for space
reasons.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix. It follows
the well-known backward induction method: using first-order
optimality conditions, we first express the CP investment levels
as a function of the other decisions (prices and investments);
then we include that decision in the ISP objective to compute
their optimal prices. Expressing the optimal side-payments
and then ISP investment involve quite some algebra, but the
methodology is the same.
The analytical expressions for investments obtained for both
cases are quite complex, and difficult to interpret. However,
the prices imposed to end-users, and the side-payments, are
very simple and can be interpreted as follows:
a) in the non-neutral regime, side payments are simply
the difference between the advertisement revenue per
click and the average user willingness-to-pay for a click
(with our interpretation of willingness-to-pay values to
be exponentially distributed with mean θ). If users are
willing to pay more than what advertising yields, ISPs
are making “too much” and the side-payment balances
things out. Reciprocally, if advertising revenues are high
with respect to what users are willing to pay, CPs choose
to compensate ISPs for each click, so that ISPs later
decide on low click-prices and hence high demand, which
in the end benefits to CPs in the form of advertising
revenues. The latter case is particularly interesting, since
it illustrates how rational CPs may decide to support ISPs
via side payments.
b) Now let us have a look at the price paid by users:
with respect to the neutral regime, we observe that ISPs
end up entirely reporting the side payments from CPs
onto users. When those side-payments are positive (CPs
paying ISPs), users are therefore charged less than in
the neutral regime. As from the above point, this is
the case when advertising revenues exceed the average
willingness-to-pay: to globally make more revenue (from
advertising), ISPs “subsidize” users by reducing their
click-prices. We also have the opposite effect when a < θ:
users being “rich” and yielding low ad revenues, ISPs
decide to charge them more.
But if we want to compare both situations at a global scale,
prices are not the only results to look at since investments
affect the quality of experience, the demand, and (in the CP
entry game) the number of CPs that enter the market. To have
a reasonable comparison metric, we define the user surplus
UW at the equilibrium, as the cumulated value of the system
for users, i.e.,
UW =
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
∫ +∞
p=p˜
Bn,m(p)dp
= NMγθc˜v t˜we−p˜/θ
Also for comparison purposes, let us express the revenue of
each ISP n (still at equilibrium) for the non-neutral regime:
ΠTn = Mθγ
(
θ
v
1− v
vγ
β
) v
1−v
t˜
w
1−v e
q/θ−pi
1−v pi
1
1−v (1− pi)−
v
1−v
−αt˜,
with t˜ given in (5). Similarly one can express the ISP revenue
in the neutral regime.
Focusing on the CP point of view, the revenue of each CP
m in the non-neutral regime is
ΠCm =
(
N(a− q)
γ
(β/v)v
) 1
1−v
t˜
w
1−v e
q/θ−pi
1−v (1− v)− βce,
(8)
and the one for the neutral regime can similarly be drawn from
Proposition 1.
Again, those expressions are too complex to allow direct
interpretations. For that reason, in Section V we will use nu-
merical results on a given scenario to compare both neutrality
regimes.
IV. ENTRY GAME FOR CONTENT PROVIDERS
Until now, we had assumed that the numbers of CPs and
ISPs were fixed. We now relax that assumption for CPs, by
considering that new CPs enter the market as long as it is
profitable for them, i.e., as long as the revenue (8) with one
additional CP remains positive. On the other hand, the number
of ISPs is still assumed fixed. We then have the following
result.
Proposition 3: Assume that the CP entry cost ce is strictly
positive, and denote by ΠCm(N,M) the revenue of each CP
at the symmetric equilibrium of the investments/prices game
G(N,M) with N ISPs and M CPs. Then for any fixed number
N of ISPs, the number M of CPs that enter the game is
uniquely defined.
More precisely, let us define M as the unique strictly
positive solution x of x = 1−v−wk
(
ekx − 1
)
. Then,
• either ΠCm(N,M) < 0 for M = ⌊M⌋ and M = ⌈M⌉,
in which case ΠCm(N,M) < 0 for any M ≥ 1, and no
CP enters the game;
• or {M ≥ 1 : ΠCm(N,M) ≥ 0 and ΠCm(N,M + 1) <
0} is a singleton, giving the number of CPs entering the
game. In particular, that number is larger than ⌊M⌋.
Proof: We focus on the dependency in M of ΠCm(N,M)
at the equilibrium of G(N,M). From (11) and (12), the
variations (sign of the derivative with respect to M , seen as
a continuous variable) of ΠCm(N,M) are the same as those
of the equilibrium CP investment c, itself being given in (7),
were the only term involving M is γt˜w.
Isolating in (5) the terms that depend on M (namely, γ
and M ), we conclude that the variations of γt˜w (and hence,
of ΠCm(N,M)) follow those of γ
(
M
1−v
1−v−w γ
1
1−v−w
)w
=
(γMw)
1−v
1−v−w
, that are simply those of g(M) := Mwγ =
1−e−kM
M1−v−w . The function g is strictly positive on R
+
, tends to 0
at zero, and its differential has the same sign as
x−
1− v − w
k
(
ekx − 1
)
,
which is concave, null at 0, and tending to −∞ as x tends to
infinity. Additionally it is strictly positive for x > 0 sufficiently
small (since having a strictly positive derivative at 0) and
therefore has a unique strictly positive root M: g(x) is then
strictly increasing for x < M and strictly decreasing for
x >M.
As a result, if CP revenues are strictly negative for the
integers closest to M then they are negative for any M , and
otherwise at least M CPs will enter the market, their number
increasing until the CP revenue from an additional entry gets
strictly negative.
Proposition 3 provides us with a method to compute the
unique number of CPs entering the game, which we will use
in the next sections on a specific numerical example.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS WITH AN ENTRY GAME FOR
CONTENT PROVIDERS
We propose here an illustration of our results with the
default parameter values displayed in Table II, in order to
compare the neutral and non-neutral settings with respect to
the terms whose expressions were too complex to interpret,
and which involved in particular the equilibrium investment
values. We focus on the consequences of the CP-ISP interac-
tions, specifically user welfare and paid prices, as well as the
investment level quantified by the number M of CPs entering
the market.
Choosing “real” parameter values for our model is a difficult
task, which would involve collecting and analyzing market
data, and is beyond the scope of this paper. We take values
that seem realistic to us, but are aware more work is needed
to fine-tune those parameters in order to closely represent a
specific market. With respect to our observations following
a θ w v N α β ce k
15 10 0.3 0.3 2 1.2 1.2 0.15 0.1
Table II
DEFAULT PARAMETER VALUES
Proposition 2, we are here in a case where advertisement
revenues (a) exceed the average user willingness-to-pay (θ):
in the non-neutral regime CPs with therefore choose to pay a
positive side-payment to ISPs, in order to stimulate demand
(and thus advertisement gains).
A. Influence of ad revenues and user average willingness-to-
pay
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number M of CPs
entering the market, the CP and ISP investment levels and
corresponding user welfare at equilibrium, and the different
prices, when the user insensitivity to prices θ (which we can
also interpret as the average user willingness-to-pay if CP
and ISP investments were set to 1) and the revenue-per-click
from advertisers a vary. Remark that in the neutral regime,
when advertising does not yield enough revenue (a too small),
no CP enters the market and user welfare is null; on the
contrary, in the non-neutral regime, negative side payments are
sufficient to attract CPs in those cases. For our default values,
the non-neutral regime attracts more CPs than the neutral one
and leads to smaller prices per click for users, both effects
contributing to a higher user welfare. In particular, we are in
a zone where users value extra content diversity significantly,
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Figure 2. Impact of user price insensitivity θ and advertising revenues a on
the number of CPs (M ), ISP investments (t), CP individual investments (c),
user welfare, and prices (including prices per click and side payments), with
N = 2 ISPs. A vertical line indicates the reference case (values in Table II).
as illustrated by the slope of Mγ in the region of interest
displayed in Figure 3. Remark also that CP investments seem
to be approximately constant, as soon as entering the market
is beneficial. However, those effects are inverted when users
0 50 100
0
1
2
non-neutral
neutral
M
M
γ
Figure 3. M × γ (quantifying how users value content diversity) versus M
for N = 2
become very price-insensitive (values of θ above a): then the
neutral regime leads to more CPs, cheaper clicks for users, and
more user welfare. Note that in this region the CPs actually
get paid by ISPs since q < 0. We nevertheless expect to
rather be in the region when a > θ, given the trend in the
last decade toward advertisement-financed (rather than price-
based) services.
Finally, Figure 4 highlights the influence of the parameter
v (demand sensitivity to content creation) and of the CP entry
cost on user welfare. As expected, large entry costs imply
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
20
40
v
U
W
0 0.2 0.4
0
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15
CP entry cost ce
U
W
Non-neutral Neutral (q=0)
Figure 4. Impact on demand sensitivity to content v and CP entry cost ce
on user welfare.
fewer CPs and thus reduce user welfare, but the non-neutral
regime always performs better than the neutral one (still,
with our values where a exceeds θ). A larger v increases the
difference (even the ratio) between the two regimes, in favor
of the non-neutral one.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
From our results, the superiority of one regime over the
other depends on parameters: advertising rates, price sensitiv-
ity of end-user demand, CPs’ entry costs, the magnitude of
effect of the added content variety on user demand, and the
relative importance of CPs and ISPs investments. We therefore
suggest that our results call for caution in designing neutrality
regulations.
However, the relative values of the expected revenues from
advertisement and the average willingness-to-pay of users
seem to play a particular role: when advertisement revenues
are small, our model suggests that a neutral regime should
be preferred, while with high advertisement revenues (with
respect to user willingness-to-pay) a non-neutral regime leads
to lower prices for users, higher user welfare and higher
ISP investments. This situation is due to CPs volunteering
to fund ISPs through side-payments, so as to stimulate their
investments in order to earn CPs more advertising revenue
through higher user demand. As we think we are currently
in a situation where users tend to be willing to pay less and
less, and many services are financed through advertising, such
non-neutral settings are worth considering.
Among directions for future work, we think that considering
competing ISPs (instead of here, several ISPs each being a mo-
nopolist over some population) deserves a thorough analysis.
Also, in such a context it would be interesting to consider an
entry game for ISPs as well. Finally, to carry out numerical
analyses on some specific markets, some econometric work is
needed to fine-tune the setting of the model parameters.
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APPENDIX
A. CP optimal investment choice
Assume that N and M are fixed, as well as prices and ISP
investments. The revenue of CP m, 1 ≤ m ≤M is
ΠCm = γc
v
m
N∑
n=1
(a− qn(m))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ − β(cm + ce).
The first-order condition for cm to be optimal to CP m yields
cm =
(
vγ
β
∑
n
(a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ
) 1
1−v
. (9)
For notational convenience, let us define
Am :=
∑
n
(a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ (10)
so that cm =
(
Am
vγ
β
) 1
1−v
. (11)
The resulting profit ΠCm optimized with respect to cm is:
ΠCm =
(
Am
γ
(β/v)v
) 1
1−v
(1− v)− βce. (12)
B. ISP choices of user prices
Now consider ISPs fixing user prices
(pn(m))1≤m≤M,1≤n≤N through a noncooperative game,
anticipating optimal CP investments.
Substituting (11) into (2), ISP n prices should maximize
M∑
m=1
{
γ [pn(m) + qm(n)] t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ ×
[
vγ
β
] v
1−v
A
v
1−v
m
}
,
where Am is given by (10). Considering qm and t as fixed
(already chosen), and noting that Ak is independent of pn(m)
when k 6= m, each user price pn(m) should maximize
(pn(m) + qm(n))e
−pn(m)/θA
v
1−v
m .
Since dAmdpn(m) = −
a−qm(n)
θ t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ
, this leads to the first-
order condition for each n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N and m, 1 ≤ m ≤M :
θ
pn(m) + qm(n)
− 1 =
v
1− v
(a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ
Am
.
(13)
Summing over n, we obtain
N∑
n=1
1
pn(m) + qm(n)
=
1
θ
(
v
1− v
+N
)
. (14)
C. CP optimal choice of qm(n)
From (12), we observe that maximizing ΠCm with respect to
qm(n) is identical to maximizingAm. The first-order condition
(at an interior equilibrium) is then dAmdqm(n) = 0, i.e., for all n
and m,
∂Am
∂qm(n)
+
N∑
k=1
∂Am
∂pk(m)
dpk(m)
dqm(n)
= 0, (15)
Recalling that Am :=
∑
n(a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ
, this gives
twn e
−pn(m)/θ +
N∑
k=1
a− qm(k)
θ
twk e
−pk(m)/θ
dpk(m)
dqm(n)
= 0.
(16)
Now, let us consider two different ISPs, indexed with n and
n1 6= n, and differentiate (13) with respect to qm(n1). Using
the fact that dAmdqm(n1) = 0, we have
dpn(m)
dqm(n1)

1 + 1θ v1− v (a− qm(n))t
w
n e
−pn(m)/θ
Am︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×
×
(
1−
pn(m) + qm(n)
θ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 from (13)

 = 0,
hence at an equilibrium we have
dpn(m)
dqm(n1)
= 0 when n1 6= n. (17)
Now, differentiating (14) with respect to qm(n) gives
1
(pn(m) + qm(n))
2
(
dpn(m)
dqm(n)
+ 1
)
= 0,
that is, dpn(m)
dqm(n)
= −1. (18)
Plugging (17) and (18) into (16), we get
twn e
−pn(m)/θ
(
1−
a− qm(n)
θ
)
= 0,
hence
qm(n) = a− θ for all 1 ≤ m ≤M, 1 ≤ n ≤ N. (19)
We remark that those prices are all the same, and are
independent of the ISP investments (t1, . . . , tn).
Using the knowledge of all (qm(n)) having the same value
q, we use (13) to re-write Am as
Am = θ
v
1− v
pn(m) + q
θ − (pn(m) + q)
twn e
−pn(m)/θ ∀n = 1, . . . , N.
(20)
D. ISPs optimal investments tn
Plugging the expression (20) for Am into the expression of
ISP investments, we obtain that for any n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
ΠTn = γ
(
θ
v
1− v
vγ
β
) v
1−v
×
×
M∑
m=1
t
w
1−v
n
{
(pn(m)+ q)
1
1−v e−
pn(m)
θ(1−v)(θ − (pn(m) + q))
− v1−v
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Hm
−αtn.
The first-order condition with respect to investment tn is
∂ΠTn
∂tn
+
∑
m
∂ΠTn
∂pn(m)
dpn(m)
dtn
= 0,
that is, using the notation K := αγ
(
θ v1−v
vγ
β
)− v1−v
,
(1− v)K =
M∑
m=1
Hm
(
w
tn
+
dpn(m)
dtn
[
1
pn(m) + q
−
1
θ
+
v
θ − (pn(m) + q)
])
(21)
From the symmetry of the model, we will focus on cases
when pn(m) = pn(m′) = pn (i.e., each ISP charges users
the same price for all CPs) for any ISP investment profile.
Therefore, dpn(m)dtn =
dpn
dtn
and all (Hm) have the same value
(denoted by H), so that (21) becomes
1− v
M
K
H
=
w
tn
+
(
1
pn + q
+
v
θ − (pn + q)
−
1
θ
)
dpn
dtn
(22)
Again from symmetry arguments, we will actually only look
here for a symmetric equilibrium, where all ISP investments
have the same value t˜ and all user prices are equal to p.
To express the first-order conditions, we will look at an
infinitesimal deviation in investment from ISP 1, playing t1
instead of t˜, in order to determine the equilibrium common
investment value t˜.
To use (22), we therefore need to compute dp1dt1 at our
equilibrium symmetric point. This is obtained in two steps:
• differentiating (14) with respect to t1 (still at the point
t = (t˜, . . . , t˜)), we obtain (using the fact that qm(n) = q
does not depend on ISP investments) that for all m,
N∑
n=1
dpn(m)
dt1
= 0; (23)
• On the other hand, (20) and the definition of Am yield
N∑
n=1
twn e
−pn(m)/θ =
v
1− v
pn1(m) + q
θ − (pn1(m) + q)
twn1e
−pn1(m)/θ
for any n1, 1 ≤ n1 ≤ N . Taking n1 6= 1 and differ-
entiating both sides with respect to t1, we have at our
symmetric equilibrium
w
t˜
t˜we−p/θ −
1
θ
t˜we−p/θ
N∑
n=1
dpn(m)
dt1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 from (23)
= Nt˜we−p/θ
(
1
p+ q
+
1
θ − (p+ q)
−
1
θ
)
dpn1(m)
dt1
,
or
w
t˜
= N
(
1
p+ q
+
1
θ − (p+ q)
−
1
θ
)
dpn1(m)
dt1
.
Doing the same for all ISPs n 6= 1, dpn(m)dt1 =
dpn1(m)
dt1
,
and therefore from (23)
dp1(m)
dt1
= −(N − 1)
dpn1(m)
dt1
=
1−N
N
w
t˜
1
1
p+q +
1
θ−(p+q) −
1
θ
(24)
But from (14), we obtain
p+ q =
θ
1 + vN(1−v)
= θpi, (25)
with pi := 1
1 + vN(1−v)
,
which when plugged into (24) yields
dp1(m)
dt1
= −
N − 1
N
θw
t˜
1
1
pi +
1
1−pi − 1
(26)
We can also use (25) in (22), and get the equilibrium
condition
1− v
M
K
H
=
w
t˜
+
1
θ
(
1
pi
+
v
1− pi
− 1
)
dpn
dtn
=
w
t˜
(1−R) (27)
with R := N−1N
1
pi+
v
1−pi−1
1
pi+
1
1−pi−1
. Remark that R ∈ (0, 1).
We now need to express the value of H , where p+ q = θpi
from (25):
H = t˜
w
1−v (p+ q︸ ︷︷ ︸
θpi
)
1
1−v e−
p
θ(1−v) (θ − (p+ q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θ(1−pi)
)−
v
1−v
= θt˜
w
1−v e−
1
1−v (pi−q/θ)pi
1
1−v (1− pi)−
v
1−v (28)
Finally, from (27) and (28) we get the expression for the
(symmetric) equilibrium ISP investment t˜:
t˜ =
([
(1−R)
M
K˜
w
1− v
]1−v
θeq/θ−pipi(1− pi)v
) 1
1−v−w
(29)
where


pi = 11+ v
N(1−v)
R = N−1N
1
pi+
v
1−pi−1
1
pi+
1
1−pi−1
K˜ = αγ
(
v
1−v
vγ
β
)− v1−v
.
